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I .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Ordinary wills dispose of property after death. Living wills direct 
medical treatment at the end of life, before death has come but when 
competence is lost. The analogy explicit in naming living wills after 
ordinary wills emphasizes that both speak after their maker no longer 
can express voice, about a very important part of life’s closure.
Yet the pun is misleading. Despite their similarity of nomencla­
ture, living wills and ordinary wills are very different types of direc­
tives. The differences can be summed up by saying that ordinary 
wills are performative, whereas living wills are not. The act of making 
an ordinary will effects powerful changes with respect to the distribu­
tion of property. By contrast, the current legal treatment of living 
wills assures only relatively limited and fragile changes in the medical 
treatment of an individual. In many jurisdictions, an individual can 
“turn down” medical care, even though they have become incompe­
tent, without a living will. But an individual cannot distribute their 
property after death without a real will. On the other side, real wills 
are effective until they are formally revoked or replaced; living wills 
may lose force with the simple expression that an indidual’s desires 
have changed.
Moreover, the law responds very differently to changes of desires 
with respect to the disposition of property after death and of one’s 
person after competence has been lost. The problems posed by ex­
pressed changes of desire are complex, especially when a person’s 
competence is in doubt at the time when the change is expressed. 
Consider a person who has stoutly maintained over the years that she 
never wants to be dependent or a burden, as she might be if respira­
tor-dependent, but who during the downhill course of amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis apparently responds affirmatively to questions about 
use of a respirator. Questions of competence, understanding, and the
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reliability of communication are obvious in this example. So also is 
the policy issue of whether to err on the side of life. Moreover, there 
are arguments to be made in favor of following either the current or 
the earlier preferences. On the one hand, current preferences may be 
better informed than earlier, inexperienced preferences; life with a 
disability such as incontinence or immobility may seem better—or 
worse—than one had thought it would be in the abstract. On the 
other hand, immediate preferences may not reflect longer term 
desires, autonomous choice, or longstanding conceptions of how life is 
to be lived. Just as Ulysses firmly determined in advance to be re­
strained from the Sirens, yet begged to be released when he heard 
them, intensely expressed present desires may not realize one’s 
longer view of the shape of one’s life or one’s death.1
This article will first compare the performative structure of ordi­
nary wills with the weaker force of living wills. It will then examine 
the policies behind these differences: for ordinary wills, predomi­
nantly the need for certainty in the distribution of property; for liv­
ing wills, the protection of life. The law of ordinary wills reflects lib­
eral political theory about the rights of individuals to do as they wish 
with their property, tempered by the social need for certainty about 
control of property; the law of living wills limits autonomous choice 
by the protection of life. It will be argued that it is in some respects 
wise to structure living wills as non-performative, but that living wills 
should not be as limited in scope as they are. Finally, the analysis 
will be applied to the hardest situation involving living wills, that of 
apparent change of desires by a person whose competence becomes 
questionable.
II. O r d i n a r y  W i l l s
Making an ordinary will is an act of great legal significance. From 
the moment of its making, an ordinary will orchestrates the disposi­
tion of an individual’s property at death. The impact of an ordinary 
will is usually ongoing, despite changed circumstances or expressed 
desires. There are a number of ways in which the structure of the law 
of ordinary wills manifests their continuing performative character.
First, an individual’s desires with respect to the distribution of 
property have no legal status without a valid ordinary will. No matter 
how frequently, how loudly, or how convincingly they are expressed, 
personal desires are irrelevant to property distributions. An individ­
1 For a discussion of the problem of changed preferences and rational choice theory, see J. 
Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (1984).
ual who dies without an ordinary will dies intestate, and the state 
statute governing intestate succession takes over.2 To be sure, intes­
tate succession statutes are constructed to reflect both public policy 
considerations and generalizations about how people might want 
their property to be distributed: to spouses, children, parents, and 
other less closely related family members.3 These generalizations, 
however, are gross at best and may well be inaccurate in a particular 
case. Even if the evidence is overwhelming that distributing the dece­
dent’s assets according to the statute does not mirror someone’s 
wishes, it will, nevertheless, be applied unless the formal mechanism 
of a will has been invoked. Someone can say daily that she never 
wants a penny of her property to go to her ungrateful daughter; with­
out a will, these comments are legally insignificant.
A second feature of the performative structure of ordinary wills is 
their continued life. Valid wills remain in effect until they are for­
mally revoked, by a new will or by destruction, or until divorce.4 Ex­
pressions of desires to change or undo a will are legally unavailing 
until the will is defaced or replaced by its maker according to statu­
tory form.5 Someone who has announced to the world that he is on 
his way to change his will, but is killed en route, dies with his old will 
unaltered.
There is a doctrine of mistake in the traditional law of wills, but it 
does not center on whether the will adequately reflects the testator’s 
desires. An instrument is invalid if at the time of execution, its maker 
does not know it is a will or does not know its contents.6 If the testa­
tor knows the will’s contents, however, but omits an important provi­
sion or misunderstands the legal effect of what the will provides, the 
court will not reform the will despite what the testator’s desires 
might have been.7 Courts also refuse to reform wills despite mistakes 
about important extrinsic facts, including such highly relevant fac­
tors as paternity.8 Nor is it relevant that the testator’s desires 
changed between the time he made the will and the time of his
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1 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-101 (1978); Uniform Probate Code § 2-101 (West 1982).
3 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-102 & comment (Supp. 1987). The Comment to the Uni­
form Probate Code § 2-102 asserts that allocating at least a one-half share to the decedent’s 
spouse better reflects the desires of married persons than most earlier statutes on the descent 
of property. Uniform Probate Code § 2-102 comment.
4 Uniform Probate Code §§ 2-507, 2-508 (West 1982).
5 Id. at § 2-508. (“No change of circumstances other than as described in this section revokes 
a will.”). T. Atkinson, Law of W ills, § 84, at 22 (2d ed. 1953).
6 1 Page on Wills §§ 13.3, 13.4 (3d ed. 1960).
7 Atkinson, supra  note 5, § 60, at 281; Page on W ills, supra  note 6, at 13.7.
8 Page on W ills, supra  note 6, at 13.7.
death, unless a will has been formally revoked. Traditional commen­
tators attribute this to the importance of formality in the law of 
wills.9
To be sure, there may be challenges to whether the will reflects the 
autonomous choice of its maker. For example, questions may be 
raised about whether undue pressure was placed on the maker of the 
will, or whether the maker of the will was of sound mind. But, like 
the doctrine of mistake, these will be treated as challenges to the 
original validity of the will, not as concerns about whether the will 
reflects what its maker really wanted. Evidence relevant to such chal­
lenges will include the testator’s capacity and pressures upon him,10 
but not whether the will evidences his preferences.
Challenges may also be raised to the meaning of wills. If, for exam­
ple, a will contains an apparent misdescription, an issue of interpre­
tation may be raised. But it will be treated conventionally only as a 
matter of understanding the testator’s intent as expressed in the doc­
ument, not as a matter of unearthing the testator’s actual desires.11 
Only in cases of outright ambiguity will evidence of the testator’s in­
tent traditionally be admitted.12
There are, finally, public policy limits on what a testator may do by 
means of a will. The rule against perpetuities prevents property from 
being left in limbo indefinitely. The decedent’s spouse may take an 
elective share, clearly an enforced transfer.13 Many state statutes now 
prohibit homicidal devisees from profiting under a victim’s will.14 D e­
spite these limits, however, having a valid will makes nearly all the 
difference in what happens to one’s property after death.
III. L iv in g  W il l s
Unlike ordinary wills, living wills are not performative. Their mak­
ing does not change all; indeed, it may change very little. The indi­
vidual’s expressed desires may have legal effect without the making
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• Page on W ills, supra note 6, at 13.12 (Supp. 1986).
10 Atkinson, supra note 5, § 100, at 531.
11 See, e.g., Uniform Probate Code § 2-603 (West 1982); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-603 (1978) 
(“The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions. 
The rules of construction expressed in the succeeding sections . . . apply unless a contrary 
intention is indicated by the will.”); Page on W ills, supra note 6, at 13.9.
12 Atkinson, supra note 5, § 60, at 281.
13 Uniform Probate Code § 2-201 (West 1982).
14 Id. at § 2-803; Dworkin, Law’s Empire 15-20 (1986). For example, in Riggs v. Palmer, 115 
N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889), the court would not allow a murdering nephew to take under his 
grandfather’s will. The court’s disallowance has become a classic in jurisprudential discussions 
of the relationship between morality and law.
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of a living will. Similarly, expressed desires other than those embod­
ied in a living will may have continued effect despite the will’s exis­
tence. And living wills can be undone by evidence that they no longer 
reflect desires, despite the lack of formal revocation.
A. The L im ited N ature of Living Wills
By early 1987, some thirty-eight states and the District of Colum­
bia had living will legislation.18 The advent of living will legislation 
has been regarded as a major gain by those supporting values of indi­
vidual choice and “death with dignity.” Yet most living will statutes 
add little beyond clarification to the legal rights of patients. Despite 
their grand title, living wills are very limited Jn scope.16 Two limits 
are most important to what they can accomplish. First, in most states 
they are only effective to refuse extraordinary, life-prolonging care. 
Second, they are effective to refuse care only after a patient has be­
come terminally ill—or, in some states, when death is very near; they 
are not advance directives through which treatment can be refused 
more generally.
1. Types of Care That Can Be W ithheld Under a Living Will. 
The types of care that may be refused by living wills vary from state 
to state. By far the predominant approach is a basic refusal of inter­
ventions without prospect of real improvement or cure. Widely circu­
lated living will forms typically describe the treatment to be refused 
with general adjectives such as “life-sustaining” or “life-prolonging.” 
For example, the living will form recommended by the recent Presi­
dential commission on ethical problems in health care directs the 
withholding of “life-sustaining procedures,” and in their place natu­
ral death with “only the administration of medication or the per­
formance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide me 
with comfort care” or to alleviate pain.17 The 1985 Uniform Rights of 
the Terminally 111 Act, now adopted in six states, suggests a simple 
form refusing treatment that “only prolongs the process of dying and 
is not necessary to . . . comfort or to alleviate pain.”18 The definition 
of life-sustaining treatment suggested in the Uniform Act uses the
15 A Matter of Choice: Planning Ahead for Health Care Decisions 41 (American Assoc, 
of Retired Persons 1987).
16 For a criticism of living wills which emphasizes their limits as a method of dialogue be­
tween patients and physicians, see S. Johnson, Sequential Domination, Autonomy and Living 
Wills, 9 W. New Engl. L. Rev. 113 (1987).
”  President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forgo Life Sustaining Treatment 314-15 (1982).
“  Uniform Rights of the Terminally I II  Act § 2(b), 9b U.L.A. 614 (1987). The six adopt­
ing states are Alaska, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Montana, and Oklahoma.
same language: “any medical procedure or intervention that, when 
administered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the 
process of dying.”19 Many other state statutes suggest similar forms.20
These basic forms apparently leave to medical judgment the dis­
tinction among life-prolonging care, comfort, and cure. Artificial res­
piration and circulation, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation, are typi­
cally deemed to prolong dying and thus to be withheld under the 
general language of a living will.21
On the other side, painkillers are generally regarded as part of 
comfort care and thus administered, although debate still surrounds 
the use of dosages that risk shortening life. One state, Vermont, sug­
gests a living will form in which the patient requests “that medica­
tion be mercifully administered to me to alleviate suffering even 
though this may shorten my remaining life.”22 Other state statutes 
contain no explicit provisions about the risks of painkillers.
Dialysis, transfusions, palliative chemotherapy, and transplant sur­
gery are forms of care that are highly interventionist but may enable 
life to be continued for relatively extended periods. Despite the fact 
that patients might differ about the desirability of undergoing these 
procedures and about the quality of life they produce, these are not 
viewed as merely drawing out the dying process, and therefore, would 
not be encompassed under a general living will. The commentary to 
the Uniform Act, for example, describes both diabetes treatable with 
insulin and kidney disease managed with dialysis as “reversible” con­
ditions. This is surely a pickwickian characterization at best because 
neither condition is curable, and the quality of life for individual pa­
tients may vary tremendously. There are exceptions to these judg­
ments: Wisconsin’s living will statute stipulates that artificial respira­
tion and circulation, blood transfusions, and dialysis should be 
regarded as “life-sustaining processes,” but draws the line at artificial 
nutrition and hydration.23
Tennessee’s statute contains perhaps the most thorough effort to
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“  Id. at § 1(4), at 611.
20 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-8A-4 (1975); Cal. H ealth  & Safety Code § 7188 (Deering Supp. 
1987); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2422(c) (Supp. 1987); La. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 40:1299.58.3(0 (West 
Supp. 1987); Mrss. Code Ann. § 41-41-107 (West Supp. 1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-9-103 
(1986); Nev. Rev. S tat. § 449.610 (1986); Or. Rev. S tat. § 97.055(1) (Supp. 1983); Tex. Rev. Crv. 
S tat. Ann. ch. 71, art. 4590h, § 3(d) (Vernon 1981); Va. Code Ann. § 54-325.8:4 (Supp. 1987); 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.122.030(1) (Supp. 1987).
21 See, e.g., S. Youngner, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: No Longer Secret, But Still a Prob­
lem, 17 Hastings Center Rep. 24 (Feb. 1987).
22 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 5253 (Supp. 1986).
23 Wrs. Stat. Ann. § 154.01(5) (West Supp. 1986).
distinguish among forms of care. Tennessee expansively describes the 
medical care that may be refused in a living will as including “sur­
gery, drugs, transfusions, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, cardi­
opulmonary resuscitation, artificial or forced feeding, radiation ther­
apy, or any other medical act designed for diagnosis, assessment, or 
treatment to sustain, restore, or supplant vital body function.” The 
statute excludes, however, “the withholding of simple nourishment or 
fluids so as to condone death by starvation or dehydration.24 Tennes­
see also suggests a non-exclusive list of what might be regarded as 
comfort care, which cannot be refused by general living will language: 
sedatives and painkillers, nonartificial oral feeding, suction, hydra­
tion, and hygienic care.26
Administration of antibiotics, nutrition, and hydration have been 
the most problematic areas to date. In some respects, these resemble 
ordinary care or simple human kindness; food and water in particular 
are traditional symbolic forms of ministration to the sick. Yet artifi­
cial feeding and hydration are invasive and uncomfortable, involving 
either insertion of a tube through the nose into the stomach or surgi­
cal entry into the intestine. More disturbingly, withholding suste­
nance may be the only ready method of ending the process of dying 
for patients hovering in conditions such as irreversible coma. Karen 
Ann Quinlan, for example, in her persistent vegetative state, was 
weaned from the respirator but was entirely dependent on artificial 
feeding for nearly ten years.26 Both the courts27 and the medical pro­
fession have recently become more willing to consider the appropri­
ateness of withholding sustenance from an otherwise hopeless pa­
tient; the most recent American Medical Association ethical opinion 
on the subject, for example, says that “ [l]ife prolonging treatment 
includes medication and artificially or technologically supplied respi­
ration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a terminally ill or irreversi­
bly comatose patient, the physician should determine whether the 
benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens. At all times, the dignity 
of the patient should be maintained.”28
The living will statutes of nearly half of the states specifically ex­
clude artificial nutrition and hydration from the category of life-sus­
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24 Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-103(5) (Supp. 1986).
26 Id. at § 32-11-103(6).
26 For a discussion of the issues of nutrition and hydration, see J. Lynn, By No Extraordi­
nary Means: the Choice to Forgo Life-Sustaining Food and Water (1986).
27 See, e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
28 AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolong­
ing Medical Treatment (Mar. 15, 1986).
taining treatment refused by a living will.29 In some of these states, 
the statutory prohibition is absolute.30 In others, the maker of a liv­
ing will may add other treatment refusal directives, but nothing is 
said particularly about the addition of directives concerning food or 
water.31 Only one state, Utah, specifies that the maker of a living will 
may refuse nutrition and hydration or antibiotics by explicit 
direction.32
In states without an explicit exclusion of nutrition and hydration 
from the living will form, it remains unclear whether a general refusal 
of life-sustaining treatment in a directive will be taken to encompass 
nutrition and hydration. No cases have addressed this specific issue. 
Some states, however, have faced the question of whether the right to 
refuse treatment outside the living will context extends to nutrition 
and hydration, and have held that it does.33 Lower court decisions in 
New York, however, have distinguished artificial respiration from 
tube feedings and refused to extend the right to refuse treatment on 
behalf of an incompetent to nutrition and hydration.34 While the 
New York legislature has the matter under study, it has not yet 
adopted a general living will statute; and the court’s refusal was 
based in part on reluctance to take judicial action on what it viewed 
as a policy issue demanding legislative resolution.38
Many of the state statutes that suggest general refusal language 
also invite clarification by the maker of a non-treatment directive. 
Makers of living wills may incorporate additional, specific types of 
treatment they wish to refuse. This opportunity has the advantages
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J“ See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 32-3201(4) (Supp. 1986); Colo. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 15-18- 
104(7) (Supp. 1986); Conn. Gen. S tat. § 19a-570 (1987); Fla. S tat. Ann. § 765.03(3) (West 
1986); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-2(5)(A) (Supp. 1987); Haw. Rev. S tat. § 327D-2 (1986); Idaho 
Code § 39-4503(4) (1977); III. Ann. S tat. ch. IIO'/j, para. 702(2)(c) (Smith-Hurd 1987); Ind. 
Code Ann. § 16-8-11-4 (West Supp. 1987); Me. Rev. S tat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2921 (Supp. 1987); Md. 
H ealth-G eneral Code Ann. § 5-602(c)(l) (Supp. 1986); N.H. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 137-H:2 (Supp. 
1986); Okla. S tat. Ann. tit. 63, § 3102(4) (West Supp. 1987); Or. Rev. S tat. § 97.050(3) (1983);
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-20.6 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1986); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1103(6)(b) 
(Supp. 1987); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 154.01(5) (West 1986).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-18-104(7) (Supp. 1986); Idaho Code § 39-4503(3) (1977); Md. 
Health-General Code Ann. §§ 5-602(c)(l), 5-605 (Supp. 1986); Or. Rev. Stat. § 97.050(3) 
(1983); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 154.01(5)(b) (West 1986).
31 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3202(c) (Supp. 1986); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 765.03(3) (West 1986); 
Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-3(b) (Supp. 1987); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327D-2 (1986); III. Stat. Ann. ch. 
110‘/2, para. 703(3)(c) (Smith-Hurd 1987); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-ll-12(b) (West Supp. 1987).
32 Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1104(4) (Supp. 1987).
33 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re 
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); Corbett v. D’Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. App. 1986).
34 Delio v. Westchester County Med. Center, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
35 Id. at 419.
of clarity and flexibility. It has the disadvantage, however, that the 
maker of a living will may be unable to anticipate all the forms of 
treatment he or she wishes to refuse. Medical technology is changing 
so rapidly that new forms of treatment may become available be­
tween the making and the effective date of a living will. Moreover, 
individuals making a living will may not be aware of invasive forms 
of treatment. Given these difficulties of anticipation, it is especially 
important that a living will, by omitting a specific form of treatment, 
is not taken to represent a deliberate choice against refusing it. Many 
state statutes take the precaution of providing that patients without 
living wills are not presumed to desire anything about accepting or 
refusing treatment.36 Others provide that living wills are to be re­
garded as supplementary to other desires of the patient.37 No state, 
however, says specifically that failure to add on other excluded forms 
of care is not to be taken as a deliberate omission.
2. The L im ita tion  to Terminal Illness. A second major limit of 
living will statutes is that they generally stipulate that the directive 
only becomes operative after its maker has become terminally ill. 
Only New Mexico extends non-treatment directives beyond the ter­
minally ill, and the extension only applies to the irreversibly 
comatose.38
State statutory definitions agree that an illness is not terminal un­
less it will result in death despite available medical care. Where stat­
utory definitions diverge on the importance of the manner of death. 
Some state definitions insist that death be imminent.39 Connecticut
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38 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-572 (1987); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-11-19 (West Supp. 1987); Md. 
Health-General Code Ann. § 5-610(2) (Supp. 1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-9-205(4) (1986); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 137-H:12 (Supp. 1986); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-140 (Law Co-op. Supp.
1986); T enn. Code Ann. § 3211110(e) (Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1117(5) (Supp.
1987); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 154.11(5) (West 1986).
37 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-8a-3(6) (1975); Cal. H ealth  & Safety Code § 7193 (Deering 
Supp. 1987); DC. Code Ann. § 6-2429(a) (Supp. 1987); Fla. S tat. Ann. §§ 765.07(3), 765.15 
(West 1986); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-ll(a) (1985); Haw. Rev. S tat. § 327D-22 (1986); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 16-8-1118(e) (West Supp. 1987); La. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 40:1299, 58.1 (West Supp. 1987); 
Md. H ealth-G eneral Code Ann. § 5-610(1) (Supp. 1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-9-205(5) 
(1986); Nev. Rev. S tat. § 449.680 (1986); N.H. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 137H:16 (Supp. 1986); N.M. 
S tat. Ann. § 24-7-9 (1978); Or. Rev. S tat. § 97.085 (1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-ll-110(d) 
(Supp. 1986); Tex. Rev. Civ. S tat. ch. 71, art. 4590h, § 11 (Vernon Supp. 1987); Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-2-1117(4) (Supp. 1987); Va. Code Ann. § 54-325.8:12 (Supp. 1987); W. Va. Code § 16- 
30-9(a) (1985); Wis. S tat. Ann. § 154.11(4) (West 1986).
38 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-3.A (1978).
38 E.g., Ala. Code § 22-8A-3(6) (1975) (“patient whose death is imminent or whose condition 
is hopeless unless he or she is artificially supported”); Md. H ealth-G eneral Code Ann. § 5- 
601(g) (Supp. 1986); Fla. S tat. Ann. § 765.03(6) (West 1986); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-20(d) 
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1986); Va. Code Ann. § 54-325.8:2 (Supp. 1987). For a criticism of Virginia’s
insists that a patient be in the “final stage of an incurable or irrevers­
ible medical condition which, in the opinion of the attending physi­
cian, will result in death,”40 a requirement that surely excludes, for 
example, patients with midstage Alzheimer’s disease. Maryland says 
that a patient must suffer from an incurable condition which “makes 
death imminent” and further describes life-sustaining procedures as 
those which “serve to secure only a precarious and burdensome pro­
longation of life.”41 Mississippi has no statutory definition of “termi­
nal” condition, but provides that directives should only be imple­
mented when there is no possibility of meaningful recovery and “but 
for the use of life-sustaining mechanisms the declarant would imme­
diately die.”42 The Uniform Rights of the Terminally 111 Act43 and 
states following it44 require that death result in a relatively short 
time without life-maintaining procedures. The practical effect of liv­
ing wills in these states which insist that death be close at hand is to 
prevent patients from being put unwillingly into intensive care or on 
life support systems during the last stages of the dying process, but 
not to prevent much else.
A number of other state statutes omit a temporal reference but say 
that an illness is terminal if life sustaining procedures only postpone 
death.45 Wisconsin’s language makes explicit the practical likelihood 
that this judgment will only be made when death is very near: “an 
incurable condition . . . that . . . would cause death imminently, so 
that the application of life sustaining procedures serves only to post­
pone the moment of death.”46 Finally, a few states say that an illness
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statute, see Note, The ‘Terminal Condition’ Condition in Virginia’s Natural Death Act, 73 Va. 
L. Rev. 749 (1987).
40 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-572 (1987).
41 Md. Health-General Code Ann. § 5-601(e), (g) (Supp. 1986).
41 Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-113 (Supp. 1986).
43 Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act § 1(9), 9b U.L.A. 612 (1987).
The commentary emphasizes that the reference is to condition rather than illness, and suggests 
that the phrase “relatively short time” means longer than “imminent.” Id. § 1, at 613 
(comment).
44 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327D-2 (1986), Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-11-9 (West Supp. 1987); Mont. 
Code Ann. § 50-9-102(7) (1986); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-103 (Supp. 1986).
40 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7187(y) (Deering Supp. 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15- 
18-103(10) (Supp. 1986); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2421(6) (Supp. 1987); III. Ann. Stat. ch. llO'/i, 
para. 702(f) (Smith-Hurd 1987); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1299.58.2(8) (West Supp. 1987); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 449.590 (1986); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 97.050(6) (1983); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. ch. 71, art. 
4590h, § 2(7) (Vernon Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1103(7) (Supp. 1987); Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 18, § 5252(5) (Supp. 1986); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.122.020(7) (Supp. 1987); W. Va. 
Code § 16-30-2(6) (1985).
46 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 154.01(8) (West 1986).
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is terminal if it will result in death despite the use of maintenance47 
or life sustaining treatment.48 These states lack an explicit temporal 
reference, but cover only patients who will die whether or not life- 
support technology is employed. They thus exclude patients such as 
stroke victims who might be kept alive for relatively lengthy periods 
of time by respiration support or artificial feeding.
Living will statutes in California and Idaho particularly stress the 
terminal nature of the patient’s condition. In both states, the patient 
cannot even make a living will until his terminal disease has been 
diagnosed.49 California insists further that the patient have been no­
tified at least fourteen days earlier of the diagnosis. For patients 
struck quickly, such as stroke or accident victims, the execution of a 
living will is a practical impossibility. California does, however, allow 
living will documents executed before a diagnosis of terminal illness 
to be treated as evidence of the patient’s desires, along with reports 
from family and friends and other information known to the patient’s 
physician.60 The reason for insistence on a terminal diagnosis appears 
to be mistrust of desires formed before confronting the reality of 
death. However, terminal patients who remain competent—those 
who could make a living will after knowing of their condi­
tions—remain able to revoke or change a living will made earlier. The 
result for the others is to deprive them of their only opportunity to 
memorialize their wishes directly.
When living wills are limited to terminal illness, directives are 
most likely to affect the deaths of people suffering from illnesses 
characterized by a progressive, relatively rapid downhill course. Some 
cancers are the primary examples. But directives will not change in­
tervention decisions for patients with chronic or slowly deteriorating 
conditions, such as multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis in its earlier 
stages, or for patients with stable disabilities, such as brain damage 
from stroke or accident. But these groups of patients encompass 
many of those who might want to rely on a living will, and they will
"  N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-2(F) (1978).
“  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3201(6) (Supp. 1986); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2501(c) (1983); 
Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-2(10) (1985).
49 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7188 (Deering Supp. 1987); Idaho Code § 39-4504 (1977). 
In addition, the District of Columbia has a very odd provision about the relevance of terminal 
illness. It allows adult persons to make living wills at any time, but requires the physician to 
certify a terminal diagnosis and communicate it to the patient. The patient’s living will does 
not become operative unless she is unable to comprehend the diagnosis. D.C. Code Ann. § 6- 
2425(b) (Supp. 1987).
so Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7191(b) (Deering Supp. 1987).
not be able to do so. The only exception is New Mexico’s extension of 
living wills to the irreversibly comatose.81
The ability to refuse treatment is further complicated for patients 
in Colorado and South Carolina, which have requirements that a pa­
tient be treated for a period after her living will is brought into play. 
South Carolina requires active treatment for six hours after the phy­
sician accepts a non-treatment declaration, presumably to ensure 
that the patient will not rally.82 Colorado requires life supports for 
forty-eight hours, to permit family members and the holder of any 
durable power of attorney to be given notice and the opportunity to 
challenge the validity of the living will.83
B. Revocation: The Fragility of Living Wills
The general tendency of living will statutes is to make revocation 
extremely easy. The Uniform Act suggests the very simplest revoca­
tion provision. A living will may be revoked “at any time and in any 
manner” by its maker.84 Comments say that this simplification is de­
liberate, to avoid any of the complexities that might be introduced by 
insistence on formalities. What the comments do not say is that this 
provision opens the door to unintended or erroneously reported revo­
cations.88 Multiple problems are involved here. The simplest is the 
risk of erroneous communication about whether a revocation has oc­
curred, as when a well-meaning hospital team refuses to accede to a 
“do not resuscitate” order for a patient, under the false impression 
that the patient’s living will has been revoked. A deeper problem is 
the issue of whether particular actions were meant to revoke a living 
will, as when a patient who can communicate very little says tearfully 
that she does not want to die. Perhaps the deepest philosophical is­
sues, about autonomy and what respect for it requires, are raised by 
the patient whose present competence is questionable but who now 
apparently rejects a living will made earlier.
It seems likely that the. less formality, the greater the chance of 
mistakes in reporting whether or not a revocation occurred and about 
whether particular actions were meant as a revocation. Several states
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51 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-3.A (1978).
M S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-30 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1986).
53 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-18-107 (Supp. 1986).
M Uniform Rights of the Terminally I II  Act § 4(a), 9b U.L.A. 616 (1987). Montana is 
among the states following the Uniform Act. Mont. Code Ann. § 50-9-104 (1986).
55 For a discussion of the ethical issues posed by second hand reports of patient desires, see
Case Study: A Cardiac Arrest and a Second Hand Report, 16 Hastings C enter Rep. 15 (Dec.
1986).
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do insist on more formality than the Uniform Act. Some provisions 
focus on the reliability of the communicative process. A number of 
states provide that revocations do not become effective until they are 
communicated to the attending physician by the patient or someone 
acting at his direction.6® A few states make revocations effective when 
the physician receives either a written revocation from the patient or 
a written confirmation from witnesses to an oral revocation.57 Ten­
nessee requires that oral revocations be made in the presence of the 
patient’s attending physician.58 Many states, however, have no safe­
guards at all about communication of a revocation.
Other states insist on further formalities to identify the event of 
revocation. Typical provisions are that a living will may be revoked 
by being obliterated, torn, or otherwise deliberately damaged; by 
written revocation; or by oral revocation. A few states go even beyond 
oral revocation to allow non-verbal revocation.58 Maryland does not 
allow oral revocations until after the declarant knows of his terminal 
condition.60 A number of states allow an oral revocation without in­
sisting that the revocation be witnessed.61 Among the states requiring 
oral revocations to be witnessed, some require only one witness,62 
others two.63 Vermont insists on two witnesses, one of whom must 
not be a spouse or a relative, presumably to avoid undue familial
“  See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 36-3203(b) (Supp. 1986); Cal. H ealth  & Safety Code § 
7189(a)(2), (3) (Deering Supp. 1987); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2424(a)(3) (Supp. 1987); Ga. Code 
Ann. § 31-32-5(a)(2), (3) (1985); Nev. Rev. S tat. § 449.620.1 (1986); N.C. Gen. S tat. § 90-321(e)
(1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-80 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1986); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. ch. 71, 
art. 4590h, § 4(a)(2), (3) (West Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.122.040(b), (c) (Supp. 
1987); W. Va. Code § 16-30-4(a)(2), (3) (1985); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 154.05(c) (West 1986).
07 E.g., Ala. Code § 22-8A-5(a) (1975); Haw. Rev. S tat. 327D-12 (1986); III. Ann. S tat. ch. 
110'/!, para. 705 5(a)(3) (1987); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1111(2) (Supp. 1987).
“  Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-106(2) (Supp. 1986).
59 Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-5(a)(3) (1985) (allowing verbal or non-verbal expressions of intent 
to revoke); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.58.4(3)(a) (West Supp. 1987) (allowing oral or non­
verbal revocation); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-321(e) (1985) (allowing revocation by any manner of 
communication).
90 Md. Health-General Code Ann. § 5-603(2) (Supp. 1986). The most likely explanation for 
the policy is that speed in revocation is not an issue before a patient is diagnosed as terminally 
ill.
91 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 36-3203(a)(3) (Supp. 1986); Fla. S tat. Ann. § 765.06(3) 
(West 1986); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-11 - 13(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987); Nev. Rev. S tat. § 449.620.1
(1986); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-80 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1986); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. ch. 71, 
art. 4590h, § 4(3) (Vernon Supp. 1987); Va. Code Ann. § 54-325.8:5 (Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. § 70.122.040(c) (Supp. 1987); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 154.05(c) (West 1986).
“  E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-111 l(l)(c) (Supp. 1987).
93 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2504(a)(2) (1983); N.H. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 137-H:7(c) (Supp.
1986); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5257 (Supp. 1986).
pressure.64 States also divide on whether a signed and dated confir­
mation of the revocation by the witnesses is necessary.65 Mississippi 
provides the most highly formal revocation procedure. In Mississippi, 
revocations must be written, signed witnessed, and, like living wills 
themselves, filed with the state bureau of vital statistics. Only a pa­
tient who cannot execute a written revocation may perform an oral 
one.06 These formalities decrease the risk that casual comments will 
be taken as a revocation. On the other hand, they may make it more 
difficult for patients with limited communicative or physical abilities 
to effect desired revocations.
The Uniform Act also stipulates that revocations may occur re­
gardless of the physical or mental condition of the living will’s 
maker.67 This provision is echoed in the living will legislation of 
nearly half of the states.68 The remainder simply provide that revoca­
tions may occur at any time. Thus states are unanimous in insisting 
that revocations are valid, no matter what the mental state of the 
declarant. Current expressed choices prevail over earlier documenta­
tion, no matter how ill-considered or hasty they are, how well they 
cohere with the remainder of a life, or how questionable the compe­
tence of the person expressing them.
Such fragility is desirable, if we want to ensure that no one is taken 
to have refused treatment who really desires to have it. Fragility is 
problematic, if patients are treated when they would prefer not to be. 
Fragility protects life and it protects the autonomy of those patients 
whose choices are accurately reflected in effective revocations. It risks 
the autonomy and privacy of patients who are taken to have revoked 
when they did not mean to have done so. These risks are especially 
high when communications of incompetent patients are not well un­
derstood. The choice is between policies that risk life, and policies
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M Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5257 (Supp. 1986).
65 Compare Ala. Code § 22-8A-5(a) (1975); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2424(a)(2) (Supp. 1987); Or. 
Rev. S tat. § 97-055(5)(b) (1983); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-llll(c) (Supp. 1987); W.Va. Code § 
16-30-4 (1985), which require written confirmation by witness, with Haw. Rev. S tat. § 327D-12
(1986); III. Stat. ch. llO'/z, para. 705(5)(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-6 
(1978), which does not require confirmation.
M Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-109(1), (3) (Supp. 1986).
67 Uniform Regulations of the Terminally I II  Act § 4(a), 9b U.L.A. 616 (1987).
68 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3203 (Supp. 1986); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7189(a) 
(Deering Supp. 1987); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2504(a) (1983); D C. Code Ann. § 6-2424 (Supp.
1987); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32(5)(a) (1985); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327D-7 (1986); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 40:1299.58.4 (West Supp. 1987); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-9-104 (1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
90-321(e) (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-80 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1986); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32­
11-106 (Supp. 1986); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. ch. 71, art. 4590h, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987); 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.122.040 (Supp. 1987); W.Va. Code § 16-30-4 (1985).
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that risk the right to privacy. Certainly, it is desirable to try to re­
duce the conflict by revocation procedures that guard against error, 
requiring witnesses and confirmation for example. But to the extent 
that the conflicts are uneliminable, and life is viewed as more impor­
tant than privacy, it is reasonable to err on the side of fragility.
Living wills also clearly take second place to a patient’s current 
desires. Some states provide explicitly that declarants’ desires at all 
times override their living wills.69 Delaware combines a stipulation 
that the desires of a competent patient supersede a living will with 
the provision that, competent or incompetent, a patient may revoke a 
living will.70 Several states require the attending physician to ascer­
tain whether a living will remains in accord with the patient’s current 
desires before acting under the directive.71 Other states accord only 
evidentiary status even to fully operative living wills.72 Desires may 
be ill-considered and fit poorly with someone’s overall approach to 
life, however. To the extent that desires do not reflect longstanding 
choices, letting them supersede living wills is harder to justify on 
grounds of autonomy than letting living wills be revoked easily.
C. The P atien t and Decision-Making W ithout a Living Will
Ironically, the limited scope and fragility of living wills persist de­
spite recognition of the underlying right to refuse medical treatment. 
Indeed, one may be more able to turn down care without a living will, 
if one is vocal enough about one’s desires, than to do so under an 
advance directive. The administration of medical care without con­
sent is a battery, and the failure to use reasonable care to assure in­
formed consent is malpractice. Competent patients have the right to 
refuse care, based on the constitutional right to privacy.73 This right 
has been held to override such state interests as preserving life, 
preventing suicide, protecting the medical profession, and protecting
*• E.g., Ariz. Rev. S tat. Ann. § 36-3205A (Supp. 1986); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2426(a) (Supp.
1987); Haw. Rev. S tat. § 327D-7 (1986); III. S tat. Ann. ch. 1101/2, para. 707 (Smith-Hurd 1987); 
W. Va. Code § 16-30-6(a) (1985); Wis. S tat. Ann. § 154.07(2) (West 1986); Utah Code Ann. § 
75-2-1108 (Supp. 1987).
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2504(a) (1983).
71 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. ch. 71, art. 4590h, § 7(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987); Wash. Rev. Code 
Ann. § 70.122.060(1) (Supp. 1987).
11 Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-ll-ll(f) (West Supp. 1987) (declaration presumptive evidence); 
Nev. Rev. S tat. § 449.640.1 (1986) (physician must give weight to living will as evidence of 
desires, but may consider other factors as well).
73 See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A 
New Protected Interest, 95 Yale L.J. 219 (1985).
innocent third parties such as children.74
In recent years, courts have increasingly struggled with whether 
the constitutional right to privacy also extends to the right of no- 
longer-competent patients to have care refused on their behalf. Two 
standards have emerged: substituted judgment, or what the patient 
would himself have chosen; and best interests, or what maximizes en­
joyment and minimizes pain for the patient.
In perhaps the first and most famous of the contemporary right to 
refuse treatment cases, In re Quinlan,76 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that evidence of Karen Ann Quinlan’s own desires was too 
scanty to permit treatment to be refused as her exercise of her own 
right to privacy. They appointed her father as her guardian, however, 
to exercise his best judgment on her behalf. Since Quinlan, New 
Jersey case law has gradually concluded that incompetent patients 
have the right to refuse treatment and developed a complex set of 
tests to enable them to exercise that right.
In cases involving incompetent patients, New Jersey looks both to 
the patient’s prognosis and to the available evidence reflecting what 
she would have chosen. In In re Conroy,™ the New Jersey Supreme 
Court faced the question of whether to discontinue artificial feeding 
for a severely impaired, but not comatose elderly woman confined to 
a nursing home. The court developed a three-level test for such cases, 
coordinating both substituted judgment and New Jersey’s version of 
the best interests test, in the effort to accommodate both the pa­
tient’s right to choose and the patient’s right to life. If there is clear 
evidence that an incompetent patient would have wanted to refuse 
treatment, these subjective preferences prevail. If there is some trust­
worthy evidence that the patient would have refused treatment, a 
“limited objective” test is applied: treatment is refused if the bur­
dens of the patient’s life with the treatment “markedly” outweigh its 
benefits. If there is no evidence of the patient’s desires, treatment is 
not withheld unless the burdens of continued existence “clearly and 
markedly” outweigh benefits and the patient is suffering so much 
pain that to continue life would be “inhumane.”77 New Jersey thus
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7t In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404. With respect to the interests of children, the New Jersey court 
noted that Mrs. Farrell had no prospect for recovery from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and her 
husband was able to care for their two sons.
71 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert, denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
76 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); see also In re Clark, 210 N.J. 548, 510 A.2d 136 (Sup. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
77 In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); In re Jobes, 
529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
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applies substituted judgment when the patient’s desires are apparent; 
and when the patient’s desires are not evident, the state insists that 
continued existence be ever more painful to justify termination of 
treatment.
It is difficult, however, to apply these tests to the situation of 
someone in a persistent vegetative state. Since death is not likely 
soon, and since pain is not intractable, either the limited-objective or 
the objective test would suggest continuation of treatment. In two 
very recent cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that these 
tests are inapplicable to patients in a persistent vegetative state. 
When there is clear evidence of what a vegetative patient would have 
wanted, New Jersey continues to apply the subjective test.78 When 
there is no clear evidence, however, New Jersey allows either the pa­
tient’s family or guardian to decide for the patient, with appropriate 
procedural safeguards to ensure that there is no reasonable possibil­
ity of return to cognitive life.79
Several other states have also adopted versions of the substituted 
judgment and best interest tests. California has case law permitting a 
competent person to decline treatment even though his illnesses are 
not likely to cause imminent death80 and allowing treatment to be 
withdrawn from an incompetent, terminally ill patient.81 Massachu­
setts has permitted artificial feeding to be discontinued on a substi­
tuted judgment standard for a patient in a persistent vegetative 
state.82
A Florida case, however, is perhaps the most telling of all about the 
limited impact of living will legislation. In Corbett v. D ’Alessandro ,83 
the Second Appellate District Court upheld the discontinuation of 
artificial feeding for a terminally ill, vegetative patient, with the con­
currence of the patient’s physician and husband that this was in her 
best interests. Mrs. Corbett did not have a living will, and the Florida 
living will statute specifically precludes the discontinuation of nutri­
tion under an ad'vance directive. Nevertheless, the court held that the 
patient’s constitutional rights to refuse nutrition and hydration were 
not curtailed by the living will legislation.84
78 In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987).
79 Id.; In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
80 Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984).
81 Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
82 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
“  487 So.2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
M Id. at 372.
D. Third Parties: The Durable Power of A ttorney and the 
P a tien t’s Relatives
It is in the role of third parties that living wills contrast most 
sharply with ordinary wills. With the exception of trusts created by 
the testator, surrogacy is not involved in decisionmaking about prop­
erty transfers after death, yet it is common in the living will context. 
Provisions about surrogacy may be defended as extensions of the pa­
tient’s autonomy, allowing others to carry on as the patient would 
have wished, when the patient can no longer act for himself. The in­
terests of third parties, however, may also be involved in surrogate 
decisionmaking. Interests in another’s dying range from convenience, 
to financial concerns, to grief at the suffering of a loved one, to in­
tense involvement in the last moments of a lifelong partner. These 
interests are of varying moral weight, but they cannot all be dis­
missed as morally unworthy.
Living will statutes appear in the main to treat surrogacy as an 
extension of patient autonomy. Provisions vary, however, and it is 
not always clear that autonomy is the interest being protected. Con­
necticut will not permit termination of life supports under a patient’s 
living will, without informed consent from next of kin or legal guard­
ian.85 Colorado insists on active treatment for forty-eight hours, in 
order to allow the holder of a durable power of attorney or members 
of the patient’s family to challenge the validity of a living will.86 Sev­
eral states provide specifically for consultation with relatives when 
the validity of a living will is in doubt.87 On the other side, Utah 
allows a living will to be revoked by the person who signed the decla­
ration on behalf of another, based on changed circumstances or a 
change of mind.88 Finally, a number of states permit family members 
to refuse treatment on behalf of a patient who lacks a living will.89
4 4  J O U R N A L  O F  C O N T E M P O R A R Y  L A W  [V o l.  1 4
“  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19A-571 (1987). ,
88 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-18-107 (Supp. 1986).
87 Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-ll-14(G) (West Supp. 1987).
88 Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-llll(a) (Supp. 1987).
"  Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-3803 (1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 765.07 (West 1986) (life-prolonging 
treatment may be withheld from incompetent patient without declaration if written agreement 
between attending physician and, in priority, guardian, holder of a durable power of attorney, 
spouse, child, parents, other nearest kin); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.58.5(2) (West Supp.
1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-8.1.A (1978) (treatment may be refused on substituted judgment 
standard when patient lacks a living will and all family members agree patient would choose to 
forgo treatment); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-322(b) (1985) (treatment of terminally ill may be discon­
tinued by concurrence of spouse, guardian, or a majority of first degree relatives); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 97.083 (1983) (spouse, guardian, parents, majority of adult children, physician in order 
of priority may discontinue treatment for a terminally ill, comatose patient without a living 
will); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. ch. 71, art. 4590h, § 4c (Vernon Supp. 1987) (guardian, or
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Only Vermont suggests explicitly that others have a moral duty to 
honor a patient’s wishes as expressed in an advance directive, in rec­
ommended living will language: “Insofar as [my desires expressed 
here] are not legally enforceable, I hope that those to whom this will 
is addressed will regard themselves as morally bound by these 
provisions.”90
States with living will statutes frequently have durable power of 
attorney statutes as well. Durable power of attorney statutes allow 
individuals to designate someone else to make health care decisions 
for them, should they become incompetent. Durable power statutes 
have the advantage of allowing the creation of decision-making mech­
anisms that function whenever incompetence occurs. In states like 
California, that do not fully recognize living wills executed before a 
terminal diagnosis, creation of a durable power may be the only way 
for a non-terminal patient to continue to direct her care, albeit 
through an intermediary. A durable power is, however, a power exer­
cised by someone else, and can only be regarded as a continued ex­
pression of autonomy to the extent that the holder of the power acts 
as the principal would have wanted him to do.
In states with both living will and durable power of attorney stat­
utes, groups such as American Association of Retired Persons regu­
larly advise people to take advantage of both mechanisms. They 
point out, quite rightly, that the mechanisms cover different situa­
tions. But this introduces the possibility of conflict. The holder of the 
durable power may want to go beyond the patient’s living will. For 
example, to turn down nutrition when either the living will fails to 
mention it or state law prohibits its inclusion. Or the holder of the 
durable power may think the maker of the living will countermanded 
too many types of treatment. Here, too, food and nutrition are likely 
examples.
Most state statutes simply ignore the possibility of conflict under 
the two types of directives. The exception is Utah, which provides 
that decisions of the holder of the durable power trump directions in 
the living will.91 Utah’s allows the holder of the durable power to re­
attending physician and if available at least two of spouse, majority of adult children, parents, 
other nearest living relative may refuse treatment, guided by any known desires of patient); Va. 
Code Ann. § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1987) (for comatose, terminal patient without directive, treat­
ment may be refused by guardian, holder of durable power or, if available, two of spouse, adult 
child, parents, nearest living relative); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1107 (Supp. 1987) (treatment 
may be discontinued with written consent of two physicians and, in priority, guardian, spouse, 
parents, next of kin, or legal guardian to be appointed for this purpose).
“  Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5253 (Supp. 1986).
*' Utah. Code Ann. § 75-2-1102(2) (Supp. 1987).
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spond flexibly to changing circumstances but for protection of auton­
omy depends heavily on her ability to follow what the patient would 
have wanted. Arizona specifies that provisions in a living will control 
decisions of any guardian later appointed for its maker.92 Arizona’s 
approach has the advantages and disadvantages of perpetuating the 
patient’s past voice over a guardian.
IV. P o l ic y  A r g u m e n t s  f o r  F o r m a l it y  a n d  F r a g il it y
It is the requirement of formalities that give real wills the 
performative structure so lacking for living wills. Without the formal­
ities of execution or revocation, a potential testator’s desires do not 
alter the legal disposition of property. A patient’s desires, by con­
trast, may be invoked to terminate treatment without the formality 
of a living will and may overwhelm even a formally executed living 
will. Patient autonomy, and even decisions made by third parties, 
continue to be recognized despite the existence of living will statutes.
Commentators on the law of real wills begin with the liberal pre­
mise that an owner has the power to dispose of his property.93 The 
formalities of the law of wills in general further the owner’s efforts to 
realize his intentions, in several ways. Because they make the execu­
tion of a will a moment of ceremony, they help ensure that a will or a 
revocation reflects a final decision of its maker—that he has made up 
his mind, rather than merely commenting about what he might do. 
Because they identify a particular document as memorializing the 
testator’s intentions, they are thought to increase the reliability of 
evidence presented to a probate court. Finally, although more prob­
lematic, they may help protect the testator against undue pressure in 
disposing of his property.94
Commentators on the law of real wills also point out, however, that 
insistence on formalities may frustrate the testator’s actual plans. 
Stock examples are the person who dies intestate because what he 
believed was a valid will was improperly signed or witnessed, and the 
person who does not understand the legal effect of a testamentary
92 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3206(1) (Supp. 1986).
93 E.g., Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 Yale L.J. 1, 2 (1941); 
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1975) (“The 
first principle of the law of wills is freedom of testation. Although the state limits the power of 
testation in various ways, within the province that remains to the testamentary power, virtually 
the entire law of wills derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of his 
property as he pleases in death as in life.”).
91 Gulliver and Tilson argue that formalities do little to protect and that there is no reason to 
believe contemporary testators, typically in the prime of life, any more vulnerable than other 
gratuitous transferors. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 93, at 9.
provision.
The formalities for real wills, however, serve functions other than 
realizing the actual desires of the testator. Judicial efficiency, the 
avoidance of frequent and protracted litigation, and certainty in the 
disposition of property are three important functions. The formalities 
force wills into standardized structures, thus simplifying the task of 
probate.96 They avoid litigation over whether the will reflects what its 
maker really wanted, either at the time he made the will or later on.96 
Interpreting wills as free-standing documents, rather than in light of 
what is known about the testator and his desires, furthers reliability 
about the disposition of property.97
Recent criticisms of the law of real wills have been directed at its 
formalism. Langbein, for example, defends a doctrine of “substantial 
compliance,” under which proponents of a formally defective docu­
ment could prove that it, nevertheless, evidences final testamentary 
intent.98 His position, however, does not ignore the policy concerns of 
efficiency and certainty. Langbein contends that substantial compli­
ance would not decrease the channeling function of wills—their abil­
ity to impress on the testator the recognition that she is indeed mak­
ing a will—because it would be confined to situations in which the 
testator really meant to make a will, and thus would not confuse 
other forms of voluntary transfers with wills. Against the argument 
that “substantial compliance” foster litigation, Langbein hypothe­
sizes that the doctrine is likely to exchange litigation in cases in 
which formalism yields frank injustice for litigation over whether the 
purported will fulfills the purposes of the probate statutes.99
Autonomy, in the sense of the freedom to choose what will happen 
to one’s person, surely is the fundamental premise of the law of living 
wills as well. Finality and the reliability of evidence are crucial, too; 
one of the major advantages of the living will mechanism is that it 
provides a clear statement of its maker’s wishes about medical treat­
ment. Indeed, living will statutes typically insist on highly formalized 
procedures for making a living will, including signature in the pres­
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** Langbein calls this the “channeling function.” Langbein, supra note 93, at 494.
“  Id. at 501.
”  Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
751, 765 (1964). Friedman, however, suggests that as other features of the structure of the real 
estate market, such as title insurance, take over this function, traditional rules about interpre­
tation of wills have softened to admit evidence extrinsic to the document in some cases. Id. at
*8 Langbein, supra note 93, at 514. For a similar discussion about Australian law, see Lang, 
Formality u. Intention— Wills in an Australian Supermarket, 15 Melb. U. L. Rev. 82 (1985).
** Langbein, supra note 93, at 525.
ence of two witnesses. This is the requirement suggested in the Uni­
form Rights of the Terminally 111 Act, and it parallels the provision 
for making real wills in the Uniform Probate Code.100 This require­
ment clearly helps to ensure that both documents represent final 
judgments and are authentic.
Protecting patients from undue pressure, however, remains of more 
concern for living wills than for real wills. Drafters of the Uniform 
Probate Code were apparently convinced that further formal require­
ments, such as the traditional rule that witnesses not take under the 
will, were more likely to frustrate genuine efforts to make wills than 
to protect testators from manipulation.101 Under the Uniform Pro­
bate Code, therefore, a legatee may witness the execution of the will. 
Not all states were equally sanguine; Utah, for example, limits inter­
ested witnesses to the lesser of the amount provided in the will or the 
amount they would take had the testator died intestate.102 Many 
state living will statutes, however, insist on further formalities.103 The 
most common is a prohibition of witnesses who are interested by rea­
son of being relatives, heirs, or financially responsible for the declar­
ant’s medical care.104 A number of states also prohibit the declarant’s 
attending physician or employees of a health care facility in which he 
is a patient from witnessing his living will.106 Several states require 
an ombudsman to be present when a living will is made by an elderly 
resident of a nursing homes.106 Perhaps the insistence on disinter­
ested witnesses for real wills can be regarded as an artifact of the 
days when wills were made on death beds rather than in attorneys’
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100 Compare Unif. Rights of th e  Terminally III Act § 2(a), 9b U.L.A. 614 (1987) with 
Uniform Probate Code § 2-502 (1982).
101 Uniform Probate Code § 2-502 & comment (1982); Langbein, supra note 93, at 496.
102 Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-505 (Supp. 1987).
103 Perhaps the least formal is Virginia, which simply requires two witnesses and permits oral 
declarations. Va. Code Ann. § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1987).
,M Ala. Code § 22-8A-4(a) (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3202 (Supp. 1986); III. Ann. 
Stat. ch. llO'/i, para. 703(e) (Smith-Hurd 1987); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-11-11(c) (Supp. 1987).
105 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7188 (Deering Supp. 1987); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 
2503(b) (1983); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2422(a)(4)(e) (Supp. 1987); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-3(a)(3)
(1987); Idaho Code § 39-4504 (1977); Md. Health-General Code Ann. § 5-602(a) (Supp. 1986); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-107(1) (Supp. 1986); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449.600 (1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 137-H:4 (Supp. 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-321(c)(3) (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. § 97.055(2)
(1983); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-104 
(Supp. 1986); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. ch. 71, art. 4590h, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987); Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 70-122.030(1) (Supp. 1987); W. Va. Code § 16-30-3(b) (1985); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 154.03(1) (West 1986) (permits employees of health care facility to witness if they are not 
directly involved in the patient’s care); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5254 (Supp. 1986).
E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 2506(c) (1983); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2423 (Supp. 1987); Or. 
Rev. S tat. § 97,055(3) (1983); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-60 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1986).
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offices.107 Drafters of living will legislation, however, clearly remain 
convinced of the importance of protecting the vulnerable from pres­
sure to terminate increasingly costly care.
Once a living will has been made, however, concern for the formali­
ties wanes. Instead, the primary policy consideration is avoiding ter­
mination of care for a patient who now chooses to have continued 
care. The fragility of living wills is the result, and to some extent it 
can be justified. Particularly for frail patients, whose strength and 
lucidity fluctuate, making revocation easy increases the likelihood 
that patients will be able to effectuate genuine revocation decisions. 
But the fragility of living wills outstrips the justification for easy rev­
ocation. If the formalities of living wills serve a ceremonial function 
akin to that of real wills—reminding their makers that a decision is 
being made—revocation should similarly be an identified event. To 
let apparent patient desires supersede a valid living will risks letting 
ill-formed and short-lived desires overrule a longstanding choice. 
Moreover, autonomy is ignored when living wills can be counter­
manded by family members or other third parties, with the possible 
exception of a holder of a durable power of attorney who at least has 
been chosen by the maker of the living will.
Finally, as with real wills, an advantage of living will legislation is 
that uncertainty and litigation over non-treatment decisions may be 
avoided when patients execute advance directives. To the extent that 
current living will legislation is limited to the terminally ill, and to 
certain forms of treatment, it achieves these goals only imperfectly. It 
is perhaps not because they have aging populations that New Jersey, 
Massachusetts and New York, and California have experienced some 
of the most extensive litigation over non-treatment decisions. Among 
those states, only California has a living will statute, and it is limited 
to documents executed after the onset of a terminal condition.
Judicial efficiency and avoiding painful controversy might not be 
enough to justify extending the scope of living wills. But autonomy is 
crucial here too. Patients cannot now make directives that cover their 
care in non-terminal conditions, or that extend to certain kinds of 
care. The most important argument against expanding the scope of 
living wills is the protection of life. However, incompetent patients 
have been held to have constitutional privacy rights to refuse treat­
ment which outstrip the scope of current living wills, despite limits 
derived from the state interest in protecting life. A reasonable ap­
proach, therefore, would be to expand the scope of living wills to situ­
107 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 93, at 10.
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ations in which the constitutional right to refuse treatment is clear. 
This would include allowing non-treatment directives to cover condi­
tions such as irreversible coma or a persistent vegetative state in 
which there are no real prospects for return to cognitive life. It would 
certainly warrant expanding definitions of terminal illness beyond 
the very last stages of an otherwise hopeless disease process. It would 
also justify extending the types of treatment that may be refused to 
include additional forms of care that are life-prolonging without be­
ing curative or ameliorative. This approach furthers both autonomy 
and reliability of evidence about patient choices, without undermin­
ing the state’s interest in protecting the lives of those who have be­
come incompetent.
V. C o n c l u s io n
Living wills are limited and evanescent, in order to preserve life. 
Their evanescence can be partially justified, but their limits can not 
be defended as easily.
Reconsidering the case of the woman with amyotrophic lateral scle­
rosis illustrates these claims. If she lives in a state with living will 
legislation, she will be able to draft a document in which she declines 
respirator support. In many states, however, she will not be able to 
use her living will to turn down nutrition or many other forms of 
care, and thus make a reliable statement of her final views on these 
matters. Nor will she be able to direct her care unless she is termi­
nally ill or, in New Mexico, comatose. In some states, this will mean 
that she will not be able to speak through her living will until her 
disease has reached the most advanced stages.
The force of her living will, moreover, will disintegrate easily, even 
for those matters it addresses. Revocations do not require formalities, 
and therefore, may be communicated unreliably. In a context in 
which communication is problematic, the least suggestion of doubts 
about what she now wants may suffice to supersede her living will. 
She may not even know that this is what has happened. Others—her 
guardian, her relatives, or the holder of her durable power of attor­
ney—may countermand what she has said in her living will.
If her autonomy is paramount, her present considered choice 
should replace earlier memorialized decisions. Fleeting or ill-consid­
ered judgments, however, less clearly further autonomy—much less 
imperfectly communicated desires, someone else’s impression of what 
she might be thinking, or, even worse, someone else’s impression of 
what she should be thinking. It is even a further threat to her auton­
omy to let someone else’s judgment supersede her living will, unless,
as in Utah, she specifically assigned that person the power to make 
health care decisions on her behalf should she become incompetent. 
Of course, there will be patients without living wills; third-parties 
must decide about their treatment, and it is desirable to have them 
draw as much as possible on what is known of her desires. But if she 
made a living will, it was in hopes that it would avoid the need for 
such surrogacy, yet in some states it unfortunately may not.
Even though her competence is questionable, she may revoke her 
living will at any time. This is desirable if treatment decisions are to 
reflect current choices. Nevertheless, the moral problem of Ulysses 
and the Sirens should at least remind us to be as careful in how we 
identify and verify revocations of living wills, as we are in their 
making.
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